Scalability and Resilience of Software-Defined Networking: An Overview by van Asten, Benjamin J. et al.
1Scalability and Resilience of Software-Defined
Networking: An Overview
Benjamin J. van Asten, Niels L. M. van Adrichem and Fernando A. Kuipers
Network Architectures and Services, Delft University of Technology
Mekelweg 4, 2628 CD Delft, The Netherlands
{B.J.vanAsten@student., N.L.M.vanAdrichem@, F.A.Kuipers@}tudelft.nl
Abstract—Software-Defined Networking (SDN) allows to con-
trol the available network resources by an intelligent and cen-
tralized authority in order to optimize traffic flows in a flexible
manner. However, centralized control may face scalability issues
when the network size or the number of traffic flows increases.
Also, a centralized controller may form a single point of failure,
thereby affecting the network resilience.
This article provides an overview of SDN that focuses on (1)
scalability concerning the increased control overhead faced by a
central controller, and (2) resiliency in terms of protection against
controller failure, network topology failure and security in terms
of malicious attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Currently, most switching and routing solutions integrate
both data and control plane functionality. The data plane per-
forms per-packet forwarding based on look-up tables located
in the memory or buffer of the switch or router, whereas
the control plane is used to define rules based on network-
ing policies to create the look-up tables. Due to the high
demands on network performance and growing configuration
complexity, the control plane has become overly complicated,
inflexible and difficult to manage. To solve this problem a new
networking paradigm was needed, which was compatible with
the widely used Ethernet switching and IP routing techniques.
The solution was found in virtualization techniques used in
server applications, where an abstraction layer is positioned
above the server hardware to allow multiple virtual machines
to share the available resources of the server. Software Defined
Networking (SDN) adopted this paradigm and introduced an
abstraction layer in networking.
By abstracting the network resources, the data and con-
trol planes are separated. The data plane is located at the
switch hardware, where the optimized forwarding hardware
is preserved and the control of the network is centralized
into an intelligent authority with the aim to improve flex-
ibility and manageability. A centralized authority provides
the intelligence to network switches to route and control
the traffic through the network infrastructure. Optimal paths
through the network can be provided by the central authority
in advance or on demand. The current implementation of the
SDN networking paradigm is found in the OpenFlow protocol
developed by Stanford University in 2008 and is currently
under development within the Open Networking Foundation.
OpenFlow has attracted some big vendors in the networking
community and became the most popular realization of the
SDN networking paradigm.
Since the introduction of OpenFlow, much research has
been performed on two different fields, being i) scalability
and performance of the central authority in relation to the
growth of network traffic and requests, and ii) the robustness
and resiliency of the network against link and switch failures in
the network, but also failures of the central authority. Clearly,
the two are related, since scalability issues may cause failures.
In this overview, we specifically focus on scalability and
resilience of SDN. In section II, we our work from existing
surveys on SDN and OpenFlow networking. We describe the
basics behind the SDN paradigm, the OpenFlow protocol,
network controllers and compliant switches in section III. The
general framework and standard notation is given in section
IV, while sections V to VI discuss related work in relation to
our framework. Section VII concludes this overview.
II. RELATED SURVEYS
Nunes et al. [1] presented a standard survey with emphasis
on past, present and future implementations of SDN. It gives
a proper overview of possible applications that could benefit
from SDN. Feamster et al. [2] give a historical insight in
the development of SDN networks, with the emphasis on
virtualizing the network and separating the data and control
planes. A survey on security in SDN is given by Scot-
Hayward et al. [3]. The survey provides a nice categorization
on security-related research and addresses security analysis,
enhancements and solutions, as well as the data, control and
application layer of SDN. Yeganeh et al. [4] focus on the
scalability concerns in relation to current-state networking,
controllers and switching hardware. Sezer et al. [5] discus
the implementation challenges for SDN in relation to carrier-
grade networks. Suzuki et al. [6] take a similar approach
concerning OpenFlow technologies in carrier-grade and data
center networks. In [7], Lara et al. provide an extensive survey
on network innovations using OpenFlow, where the OpenFlow
specification is discussed in detail and recent experiences with
OpenFlow deployments on campus networks and testbeds are
shared.
In contrast to the above mentioned surveys, we propose a
graphical reference framework, with which SDN strengths and
frailties are identified more easily. Furthermore, we specifi-
cally focus on scalability and resilience aspects.
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Figure 1. SDN concept of abstracting the network view - On the Data Plane,
network elements (switches) provide network connectivity and status to the
Control Plane. The network elements are configured by Network Controllers
via a Control Interface for global optimized configuration. An abstract view
of the network is given to the Application Plane via a standardized interface.
Network services request connectivity from the Network Controllers, after
which the Network Elements are configured.
III. INTRODUCTION TO
SOFTWARE-DEFINED NETWORKING
In this section we introduce Software-Defined Networking
(section III-A), the OpenFlow protocol (section III-B), Open-
Flow controllers (section III-C) and Open vSwitch (section
III-D).
A. Abstracting the network
In the SDN philosophy, the network topology is configured
based on requests from network services and applications.
Services request connectivity to a network and if the request
can be fulfilled, paths through the topology are provided to
the service for the requested amount of time. In figure 1 the
SDN concept is presented.
The SDN concept speaks of three planes, which do not
correspond directly with the OSI reference model. A short
description of the planes is given below:
• Data Plane - The Data Plane is built up from Network
Elements and provides connectivity. Network Elements
consist of Ethernet switches, routers and firewalls, with
the difference that the control logic does not make
forwarding decisions autonomously on a local level.
Configuration of the Network Elements is provided via
the control interface with the Control Plane. To optimize
network configuration, status updates from the elements
are sent to a Network Controller;
• Control Plane - Network Controllers configure the Net-
work Elements with forwarding rules based on the re-
quested performance from the applications and the net-
work security policy. The controllers contain the forward-
ing logic, but can be enhanced with additional routing
logic. Combined with actual status information from the
Data Plane, the Control Plane can compute optimized
forwarding configurations. To the application layer, an
abstract view from the network is shared via a general
Application Programming Interface (API). This abstract
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Figure 2. SDN-enabled Ethernet switch - Incoming traffic is matched to SDN
Forwarding Rules and on positive matching traffic is forwarded as normal.
Information of unmatched packets is sent to the central control logic (Network
Controllers), where new SDN forwarding rules are computed and configured
at the SDN switches involved for transporting the data packets. The local
control logic is enhanced with a configuration interface (SDN protocol) to
communicate with Network Controllers.
view does not contain details on individual links between
elements, but enough information for the applications to
request and maintain connectivity;
• Application Plane - Applications request connectivity
between two end-nodes, based on delay, throughput and
availability descriptors received in the abstract view from
the Control Plane. The advantage is the dynamic alloca-
tion of requests, as non-existing connectivity does not
need processing at local switch level. Also applications
can adapt service quality based on received statistics. For
example to throttle the bandwidth for video streaming
applications on high network utilization.
By decoupling the control logic the management of switches
simplifies, as decisions to flood or forward data packets are not
made locally anymore. Header information from data packets
at the switches must be transmitted to the central control
logic for processing and configuration computations, which
introduces an additional delay in packet forwarding. As seen
in figure 2, the basic functionality of the SDN switch is similar
to that of an Ethernet switch. Header information is matched
to the configured SDN Forwarding Rules and packets are
subsequently forwarded to the configured outgoing port(s).
Unmatched header information is sent to the central control
logic via the SDN control interface. Thus, for communication
between the SDN switch and the centralized controllers an
additional protocol is needed. This protocol must contain the
functionality to configure forwarding rules and ports, as well
be able to collect and transmit switch status and statics to the
central control logic. OpenFlow is such a protocol.
B. OpenFlow protocol
Two examples of SDN protocols are OpenFlow [8] and
ForCES [9]. More protocols exist, however OpenFlow is most
popular. OpenFlow has attracted many researchers, organiza-
tions and foundations, so a wide collection of open-source
software is available in the form of OpenFlow controllers (sec-
tion III-C), as well as physical and virtual switch implemen-
tations (section III-D). The OpenFlow protocol describes and
couples switching hardware to software configurations, such
as incoming and outgoing ports, as well as an implementation
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Figure 3. Flow diagram of the OpenFlow protocol - An incoming packet is
assigned with Packet Metadata and is matched to Flow Rules in Flow Tables.
Each Flow Rule contains instructions, which are added as Actions to the
Packet Metadata. Instructions can include forwarding to other Flow Tables.
If all Flow Tables are passed, the Actions in the Metadata are executed.
Actions define the outcome for the packets, such as Output or Drop traffic.
If a group of Flow Rules requires the same processing, Group Tables are
applied. Group tables also contain Actions. When a packet does not match,
a Table Miss is initiated and the packet can be forwarded to the OpenFlow
controller for further processing or the packet is dropped.
of the SDN Forwarding Rules. In figure 3 a flow diagram
is given of the matching process of an incoming packet in
an OpenFlow-compliant switch enabled with protocol version
1.3. A detailed survey on the OpenFlow specification is given
in [7].
The SDN Forwarding Rules, called Flows in OpenFlow, are
stored in one or more Flow Tables. For each incoming packet,
a metadata set is created, containing an Action List, Action
Set or both. In the Action List and Set actions are added for
each Flow Table the packet transverses, whereas the Actions
define the appropriate operations for the packet. Examples of
Actions are forward the packet to port X, drop the packet,
go to Group Table A or modify the packet header. The main
difference between a List and Set is the time of execution.
Actions added to a List are executed directly after leaving
the current Flow Table, whereas the Actions defined in the
Set are accumulated and executed when all Flow Tables are
processed. Each Flow Table contains Flow Entries with six
parameters [8]:
• Match - The criteria to which the packets are matched.
Criteria include parameters of the datalink, network and
transport layers contained in data packet headers and
optionally metadata from previous tables. A selection of
criteria is given in table I;
• Instructions - When a packet matches, instructions are
added to the metadata set to direct the packet to another
Flow Table or add Actions to the Action List or Set;
• Priority - The packet header can match to multiple Flow
Entries, but the entry with highest priority determines the
operations;
• Counter - Every time a packet has matched and is
processed by a Flow Entry, a counter is updated. Counter
statistics can be used by the OpenFlow controller and
Application Plane to determine network policies or for
network monitoring [10];
• Hard Timeout - A Flow Entry is added by an OpenFlow
controller, where the maximum amount of time this entry
Table I
SELECTION OF FIELDS FOR FLOW RULES TO MATCH INCOMING PACKETS
[8].
Match Field Layer Description
Ingress Port Physical Incoming ports and interfaces
Ethernet Address Datalink Source and destination MAC-address
VLAN Datalink VLAN identity and priority
MPLS Network MPLS label and traffic class
IP Network IPv4 / IPv6 addresses
Transport Transport TCP/UPD, source and destination port
may exist in the Flow Table before expiring is defined by
the Hard Timeout. The Hard Timeout can be used to limit
network access for a certain node in the network and for
automatic refreshing of the Flow Table to prevent large
tables;
• Idle Timeout - The amount of time a Flow Entry is not
matched is defined as the idle time. Idle Timeout defines
the maximum idle time and is mainly used for refreshing
Flow Tables.
From OpenFlow protocol version 1.1 and onwards, Group
Tables have been defined. Group Tables allow more advanced
configurations and consist of three parameters:
• Action Buckets - Each bucket is coupled to a switch
port and contains a set of Actions to execute. The main
difference with Instructions from the Flow Table is that
Action Buckets can be coupled to counters and interface
status flags. Based on values of these parameters a bucket
is valid or not;
• Type - Defines the behavior and the number of Action
Buckets in the Group Table. Multiple Action Buckets
can be used for i) multicast and broadcast applications,
where the incoming packet is copied over multiple Action
Buckets (multiple ports), ii) load sharing applications,
where a selection mechanism selects the Action Bucket
to execute and iii) failover applications, where from the
available Action Buckets the first live one is selected to
execute. Assigning a single Action Bucket to a Group
Table is useful for defining Actions for a large number
of Flow Entries with the same required forwarding policy;
• Counter - The number of times the Group Table has been
addressed.
With the descriptions of the Flow and Group Table we
can follow the incoming packet from figure 3. At entry, a
metadata set is assigned to the data packet and the packet
header is matched to the Flow Entries in the first Flow Table.
On match, instructions are added to the Action Set and the
packet can be processed further. When the instructions include
forwarding to other Flow Tables, the packet with metadata is
processed in a similar way and instructions are added to the
Set. When no forwarding to other Flow Tables is instructed,
the Action Set from the metadata is executed. Actions from the
Set and / or Group Table determine the process of the packet.
In switching operation, the MAC address is matched in the
first Flow Table and the Action Set defines how to forward
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Figure 4. Generic description of an OpenFlow Controller - The controllers
mentioned are built around a Core application, which acts as a backbone
in the controller. To communicate with OpenFlow switches, a translation
module translates the OpenFlow protocol parameters to the “language” used
inside the controller. Additional modules can advertise themselves to the Core
application to receive switch events. Based on the application, flow rules can
be calculated or notification are sent to the application plane.
the packet on a specified outgoing port. When none of the
Flow Entries match, a Table Miss is initiated. Depending on
the configuration by the OpenFlow controller, the packet is
dropped or transmitted to the controller for a Flow Request.
At the controller, new Flow Entries are computed and added
to Flow Tables of involved switches.
C. OpenFlow Controller
OpenFlow controllers are developed in many variations
and all share the same goal of controlling and configuring
compliant switches. In [1] and [7] a list of hardware switches
is given, all OpenFlow compliant. Main differences are found
in programming languages and support for OpenFlow spec-
ifications. Popular implementations, like NOX [11] and the
Open vSwitch (OVS)-controller from Open vSwitch [12] use
the C/C++ language, while POX [13] and Ryu [14] are
Python-based controllers. Java based controllers are found in
FloodLight [15] and OpenDayLight [16]. Only Ryu, Open-
DayLight and unofficial ported versions from NOX support
OpenFlow protocol version 1.3 so far. For more advanced
configuration purposes and the use of Group Tables, we advise
the Ryu and OpenDayLight controller. Both FloodLight and
OpenDayLight offer web browser based configuration tools
instead of command line interfaces and are therefore more
user friendly. NOX, POX and Ryu share a similar structure
and this shared structure is used to give an example of an
OpenFlow controller in figure 4.
The example controller is built around a Core application,
which acts as an backbone in the controller. To commu-
nicate with the OpenFlow switch, a translation module is
added to translate OpenFlow protocol messages to controller
parameters. Other modules, like a layer-2 switch module
(L2-switch) in Ryu, can advertise themselves to the Core
application and register on specific switch parameters and
events. The mentioned controllers supply the Core application
with translation modules for OpenFlow protocol version 1.x.
Depending on the requirements on the controllers, one can
construct and program modules and advertise these to the
controller. In figure 4 examples are given, such as a topology
module, for maintaining an up-to-date status of the network
infrastructure. Also modules for redundancy purposes can be
Open vSwitch     
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Figure 5. Description of Open vSwitch in relation to OpenFlow - With
Open vSwitch physical network interfaces from servers and computer can be
assigned to an OpenFlow switch. To connect the virtual OpenFlow switch to
a remote controller via an IP connection, a management interface (OF Man)
with IP address is assigned. The other option to configure the OpenFlow
module is via a command line interface. Other physical interfaces can be
assigned directly to an OpenFlow port, where it is also possible to bind
multiple physical interfaces to a single OpenFlow port. With other Open
vSwitch plug-ins it is possible to control the OpenFlow module.
added, to synchronize information with other controllers at the
control plane.
D. Open vSwitch
Although Open vSwitch (OVS) is not specifically designed
to enable the SDN philosophy, it is widely used by researchers
and organizations to test OpenFlow implementations and ben-
efit from flexible SDN configurations. OVS can be configured
to turn regular servers and computers with multiple physical
network interfaces into a virtual OpenFlow switch, as shown
in figure 5. Many Linux distributions, such as the Ubuntu OS,
support OVS installation from their repositories.
Depending on the required configuration, OVS can be
configured as a layer-2 switch (controlled by a local OVS-
controller) or as a generic OpenFlow switch. Configuration
of the OpenFlow module can be supplied by an external
OpenFlow controller or Flow Rules are supplied manually
via the command line interface. External plug-ins can also
configure the OpenFlow module of OVS. An example of such
a plug-in is the Quantum plug-in from OpenStack [17].
IV. GRAPHICAL SDN FRAMEWORK
To differentiate and compare the existing SDN solutions,
we have developed a graphical SDN framework. Within the
graphical framework multiple layers are defined, which indi-
cate the hierarchy level of components within SDN networks
(see figure 6).
For our graphical framework we define that controllers
perform the computations and tasks to control traffic and addi-
tional layers can be added for administrative and synchronizing
purposes. In the following we explain the layers of figure 6.
• Level-0 - Switch Layer - The lowest layer identified in
the OpenFlow structure is the switch layer, with the main
purpose to deliver data plane functionality. Data plane
functions are performed at the Switch / Open vSwitch
sublayer, where the two additional sub-layers, being the
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Figure 6. Graphical Framework for OpenFlow differentiation and compar-
ison - On the left the numerical UML relationship between the components
and layers of an OpenFlow network topology is visible. On the right a
physical decomposition of the same configuration is given to clarify the UML
relationship.
Additional Switch Layer and Local OpenFlow Controller,
add additional functionality to perform minor control
plane tasks;
• Level-0.5 - Virtualization Layer - On top of the switch
layer, the Virtualization Layer can be placed with the
main function to divide and share the switch resources
over multiple OpenFlow controllers. It enables multiple
virtual network topologies on top of a single physical
infrastructure. Resources of physical switches are virtu-
alized by this layer and presented to the Control Layer
as multiple virtual switches;
• Level-1 - Control Layer - The functionality of the control
layer is to perform the tasks of the SDN control plane
in a defined area of the network topology for a number
of switches. Decisions made at this layer influence only
a part of the network and are locally optimal. In regular
OpenFlow configurations, only a single Area OpenFlow
Controller is present. Solutions have been proposed to
enhance the control layer with additional area OpenFlow
layers to extend functionality, such as synchronization of
Flow Rules with other controllers;
• Level-2 - Global Layer - The top layer has the func-
tionality to control network topology at a global level,
where forwarding and routing decisions influence the
whole topology. A Global OpenFlow Controller can thus
compute globally optimal routes through the network, as
it controls all switches. The structure of the global layer
is similar to the control layer.
To indicate the numerical relationship between the layers, the
UML-standard, as used in object-oriented programming, is
used as guidance in the framework in figure 6. The relationship
states that the components (sub-layers) at each level share a
one-to-one relationship (1..1) with each other. From the switch
Table II
EXPLANATION FOR THE DEVELOPED OPENFLOW NOTATION STANDARD
Symbol Description Relation
N No. Switches ∈ (1, 2, .., N)
V No. Virtual controllers ∈ (1, 2, .., V ),V ≤ N
P No. Virtual switches ∈ (1, 2, ..P )
C No. Area OpenFlow Controllers ∈ (1, 2, .., C),C ≤ N ,
C ≤ V or C ≤ P
G Global controller enabled ∈ (0, 1)
X+s Layer enhanced for security
X+p Layer enhanced for scalability
X+r Layer enhanced for resiliency
X+b Backup component available
level a many-to-many or many-to-few relationship exists with
the virtualization layer (N..V ) or control layer (N..C), when
no virtualization is applied. In the case of virtualization, a
many-to-few or many-to-many relation (P..C) indicates P
virtual switches are controlled by C OpenFlow controllers.
Within a domain, multiple area controllers can be controlled
by a single centralized controller with the global view of the
network. In case of an inter-domain network infrastructure,
global layers can be interconnected.
In order to differentiate multiple network topologies using
the UML relationships, we use the following notation. For net-
work topology T the notation is given as T (N/V −P/C/G),
where the description of the used symbols is given in table
II. The notation with the defined symbols of table II would
not cover the entire framework, as additional sub-layers or
applications are not indicated. Therefore an extra indicator is
added to the OpenFlow notation, to indicate if an enhancement
is added and for which enhancement area (security, scalability
and/or resiliency) the enhancement is added. Beside additional
components to the layers, it is possible from OpenFlow
protocol version 1.2 to add redundant controllers to the control
plane. Therefore the backup indicator is defined. When an
enhancement overlaps multiple areas or when a component is
applied redundantly, it is possible to combine indicators. The
controller C+sb indicates a security enhanced controller that
is redundantly applied.
Before multiple OpenFlow enhancement proposals will be
discussed, a reference OpenFlow network configuration is
given in the figure 7. The reference configuration is indicated
by T (N/ − /C/0), where the infrastructure is built up from
N switches controlled by C general OpenFlow controllers.
The flow of actions in figure 7 is as follows. Network
traffic, in the form of data packets, arrives at the switch data
plane, where the packet headers are matched to a set of flow
rules stored in the flow tables. When no match is found, the
OpenFlow module of the switch will initiate a flow request to
the assigned controller. The controller will process the event
and install the needed flow rules into the switches at the
designated route through the network, based on the policy and
rules defined in the forwarding and routing applications of the
controller.
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Figure 7. Reference OpenFlow configuration - Arriving data packets are
processed and on a Table Miss, a Flow Request is sent to a “standard”
OpenFlow controller, where network routing applications determine a new
Flow Rule based on set Policy and Rules. The new Flow Rule is installed by
the controller in the assigned switches and network traffic can transverse the
network.
V. SCALABILITY IN SDN
By introducing a centralized authority to control the network
traffic over a large network, the growth of network traffic may
not scale with the performance of the controller [4]. Multiple
proposals have been introduced [18], [19], [20], [21], [22] to
create a distributed centralized authority, to solve the concerns
on scalability and performance. In this section, these proposals
will be discussed and projected onto our developed graphical
framework.
A. HyperFlow
The proposed solution by Tootoonchian et al. [19] to solve
the scalability problem in SDN and OpenFlow networks is to
deploy multiple OpenFlow controllers in the network infras-
tructure and implement a distributed event-based control plane,
resulting in a T (N/ − /C+p/1) structure. The improvement
in scalability and performance is found in the placement of
multiple controllers close to the switches, reducing flow setup
times, while each controller is provided with the global view
of the network. Another advantage of this approach is the
resiliency against network partitioning (disconnected network)
in case of network failures, as the views of the connected
switches and controllers are synchronized.
HyperFlow, see figure 8, is built up from three layers, where
no virtualization is applied. The architecture at the switch level
(data plane) and the OpenFlow specification are unmodified,
which makes the HyperFlow concept applicable to current
SDN-capable networks. At the control layer the HyperFlow
application is connected to a standard NOX controller. To en-
able communication with the global layer, a publish-subscribe
system is placed at the additional control layer to locally store
the network status and view. The HyperFlow distributed global
layer consists of three parts: the data channel, control channel
and the distribution of functionality among the controllers.
On the data channel, network events are distributed by the
HyperFlow application. These events are stored in the publish-
subscribe system, which synchronizes the global view of the
controllers, but can operate independently in case of partition-
ing. The control channel is used for monitoring the status of
the controllers. The distribution of functionality among the
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Figure 8. HyperFlow implementation - An additional global layer and
extra OpenFlow applications at the control layer provide area controllers
with additional information, to increase decision making capabilities at the
global level for optimal data packet forwarding.
controllers is realized as follows. Each controller has a global
view of the network and its status, it has capabilities to install
flows into all switches. All required flows for a particular
data stream are published to all distributed controllers to
synchronize network state. The HyperFlow application on the
controllers filter the requested flows for the switches assigned
to it and will install the flows accordingly.
In [19] no extensive measurements are performed on differ-
ent network topologies and traffic loads, thus no conclusion
can be drawn from the HyperFlow approach to improve
scalability in real-life SDN networks. Besides that, there are
some limitations in the HyperFlow design. The first limitation
was found by the authors themselves in the performance of
the publish-subscribe system (WheelFS). All network events,
flow installs and status information need to be synchronized
between the multiple controllers, which requires a fast dis-
tributed storage system. In HyperFlow the performance of the
publish-subscribe system was limited to approximately 1000
events per second. This does not indicate that the controllers
are limited in processing, but the global view of the network
controllers may not quickly converge. A second limitation is
the lack of a management application in the global layer. In
[19] no distinction is made between the functionality of the
switches and controllers. This assumes that a global policy
for Flow Rule installations must be configured in all assigned
controllers. The last limitation is found in the performance
of HyperFlow, where network traffic may be dropped when
the offered load exceeds a controller’s capacity. Although
the load on controllers can be reduced by assigning less
switches to a controller, a single switch processing many flows
may still overload its controller. We think a solution where
Flow Requests can be forwarded to neighbor controllers for
processing or smart applications at the switch layer to off-load
controllers could be another solution.
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Figure 9. ONIX distributed control platform at area level - ONIX adds a
distributed control platform between the data and control plane to reduce the
workload on flow controllers. Switch management is performed by multiple
ONIX instances which are synchronized via two databases. Forwarding
decisions are made at area level by a general SDN flow controller.
B. ONIX
ONIX [21] is not built on-top of an OpenFlow controller, but
can be classified as a “General SDN Controller.” The approach
the developers took to abstract the network view and overcome
scalability problems, was to add an additional distributed
control platform. By adding an additional platform, the man-
agement and network control functions from the control plane
are separated from each other. The management functions,
used for link status and topology monitoring, are performed
by the ONIX control platform and reduce the workload for
a general flow controller. To partition the workload at the
control platform, multiple ONIX instances can be installed
to manage a subset of switches in the network infrastructure.
The available information is synchronized between the ONIX
instances, forming a distributed layer as seen with HyperFlow
in section V-A, but now at the controller layer. A network
controller assigned to a part of the network, can subtract
information from the distributed layer to calculate area flows.
In order to calculate global flows, ONIX has the capability to
aggregate information from multiple area platforms to a global
distributed platform. The aggregation of information and the
calculation of global optimal forwarding rules is similar to the
routing of internet traffic over multiple autonomous systems
(ASes) [23], where the route between ASes is globally deter-
mined, but the optimal route inside the autonomous system
is calculated locally. With this general introduction, we can
conclude that ONIX can be classified as a T (N/−/C+p/1+p)
SDN topology1. With the use of figure 9 more insight is given
in the design and functioning of ONIX at area level, while
1In this overview the network scope is limited to a single domain, but
the capabilities of ONIX can reach beyond that scope as it is designed for
large-scale production networks.
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Figure 10. ONIX distributed control platform at global level - Aggregate
information from multiple area controllers are combined at the ONIX global
layer, from where the global controller can determine optimal routing and
request the level-1 controllers for paths within the assigned area.
figure 10 shows how global flows are calculated using the
distributed control platform.
At switch layer no modifications are required for ONIX
and two channels connect to the switch with the Import-
Export module at the distributed platform. The ONIX plat-
form is an application that runs on dedicated servers and
requires no specific hardware to function. According to the
load and traffic intensity, multiple switches are assigned to
an ONIX instance. Multiple ONIX instances combined form
the distributed control platform. The first channel connects
the configuration database and is used for managing and
accessing general switch configuration and status information.
To manage the forwarding, flow tables and switch port status,
the second channel is connected to the OpenFlow module of
the switch. The information and configuration status collected
by the import-export module represent the network state of the
connected switches and is stored in the Network Information
Base (NIB) as a network graph. The NIB uses two data
stores, being a SQL-database for slow changing topology
information and a Dynamic Hash Table (DHT-table) for rapid
and frequent status changes (such as link utilization and round
trip times). The application of two data stores overcomes
the performance issues faced by HyperFlow. From the NIB,
a general flow controller or control logic can receive flow
requests, switch status and network topology and compute
paths. In comparison to the reference OpenFlow controller
(figure 6), the ONIX platform has the availability of switch
and link status information. Computation of paths is thus
not limited by the information provided by the OpenFlow
protocol. The last step in the flow setup process is to install the
computed flows in the switch forwarding table via the ONIX
distributed platform.
In [21] evaluation results are shown of measurements on
the ONIX distributed layer to determine the performance of
a single ONIX instance, multiple instances, replication times
between the data stores and recovery times on switch failures.
Unfortunately no information is present of the used control
logic and the performance gain in comparison with regular
OpenFlow controllers. The advantage of the ONIX distributed
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Figure 11. DevoFlow implementation - Scalability enhancements made at
the switch layer are shown as an additional layer, but are implemented as
modifications to the soft- and firmware in the switch ASIC / CPU. Routing
decisions can be made at the switch layer using traffic parameters as input to
reduce workload at the OpenFlow controller. Elephant flows invoke the use
of the area controller for optimal routing, while micro flows are routed using
cloned flow rules.
control platform is the partitioning of the workload over
multiple instances. So, if an ONIX instance is limiting traffic
throughput (dropping flow requests) due to high workload,
assigned switches can be reassigned to other ONIX instances.
C. DevoFlow
The approach of DevoFlow [18] is guided by two observa-
tions. First, the amount of traffic between the data and control
planes needs to be reduced, because the current hardware
OpenFlow switches are not optimized for inter-plane commu-
nication. Second, the high number of flow requests must be
limited, because the processing power of a single OpenFlow
controller may not scale with network traffic. To limit the
traffic and flow requests to the control plane, traffic may be
categorized into micro and elephant flows. In DevoFlow micro
flows will be processed at the switch layer, without the need
of the control layer. The DevoFlow philosophy is that only
heavy traffic users, elephant flows, need flow management.
By limiting the management to elephant flows, only one
controller is needed in the network topology, shifting the
routing complexity to the switch layer. With this information
we classified the DevoFlow solution as a T (N+p/ − /1/0)
SDN topology.
In figure 11, the DevoFlow solution is drawn as an ad-
ditional layer on top of the physical switch to simplify the
representation, but the actual implementation is performed at
the soft- and firmware of the switch. This indicates that modifi-
cations to the standard switch are required. To ease integration
of DevoFlow with other SDN concepts, no modifications are
made to the OpenFlow protocol and controller. The destination
of arriving packets is compared to flow rules installed in the
switch table. When no match is found, a flow request must be
initiated by the “Traffic Measurement” module in the switch.
The traffic measurement module monitors the packets in the
data flows and computes statistics. At the start of a flow
each flow is marked as a micro flow and an existing flow
rule from the forwarding table is cloned and modified by the
“Local Flow Scheduler.” The modification to the flow rules
allows multipath routing and re-routing. In case that multiple
paths between the switch and destination exist, the local flow
scheduler can select one of the possible ports and the micro-
flow rule for that port is cloned. Re-routing is applied when
one of the available switch ports is down and traffic needs
alternative paths through the network.
To detect and route elephant flows through the network, the
area scheduler can use four different schemes:
• Wild-card routing - The switch pushes the available traffic
statistics to the controller with a specified time interval.
The scheduler pro-actively calculates unique spanning
trees for all destinations in the network topology using the
least-congested route and install the trees as flows in the
switch flow tables. So for each destination in the network
a flow is present in the switches and no flow requests are
needed from the switch to the OpenFlow controller;
• Pull-based statistics - The scheduler regularly pulls the
traffic statistics from the switch and determines if ele-
phant flows are present in the current data flows. Once
an elephant flow is detected, the scheduler determines the
least-congested path for this flow and installs the required
flow rules at the switches;
• Sampled statistics - This method is very similar to the
pull-based scheme, but instead of pulling traffic statistics
every time period, the switch samples traffic statistics into
a bundle and pushes the bundle to the scheduler. At the
scheduler, it is again determined if any elephant flows are
present and on positive identification flows are installed,
as described in the pull-based scheme;
• Threshold - For each flow at the switch, the amount of
transferred data is monitored. Once a flow exceeds a
specified threshold, a trigger is sent to the scheduler and
the least-congested path is installed into the switches.
All schemes are based on traffic statistics, where flows are only
installed if identified as elephant flows in a reactive manner. In
[18] multiple simulations have been performed on a large data
network simulator to capture the behavior of flows through the
network and measure data throughput, control traffic and the
size of flow tables in the switches. The results show that the
pull-based scheme with a short update interval maximizes the
data throughput in the network. This performance comes at
a price, as much traffic is initialized between the switch and
controller and the size of the flow table is significantly large
in comparison with the other schemes. The threshold scheme
is identified as most optimal, as the data throughput is high,
less traffic is required between the switch and the controller
and the size of the flow table is minimal. Another advantage
is the required workload on the scheduler in the controller, as
no traffic statistics have to be monitored and processed.
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Figure 12. Kandoo implementation - A standard switch sends flow requests
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D. Kandoo
In [20] Kandoo is presented with similar goals and philos-
ophy as DevoFlow, namely to limit the overhead of events
between the data and control planes, but solves the problem
by applying more controllers in a network topology. Kandoo
differentiates two layers of controllers, namely local con-
trollers, which are located close to the switches for local event
processing, and a root controller for network-wide routing
solutions. In practice this means that local controllers will
process the micro flows and a trigger from the local controller
must inform the root controller about the presence of an
elephant flow. The number of local controllers depends on
the amount of traffic (local events) and the workload on the
controller, which is somewhat similar to the approach of ONIX
and its distributed control platform. In an extreme case, every
switch is assigned to one local controller. Translating Kandoo
to the graphical framework, the root controller is located at
the global layer and the local controllers can be found on the
area or switch layer. If the extreme case is valid, the local
controller can be seen as an extension of the switch layer and
the topology can be classified as T (N+p/−/1/0). In a regular
architecture, where more than one switch is assigned to a local
controller, a T (N/−/C+p/1) SDN topology is found. Figure
12 projects the regular case of Kandoo.
Kandoo leaves the software in the switch unmodified and
shifts the processing of events to local controllers. The local
controllers are standard OpenFlow controllers extended with
a Kandoo module. This approach keeps the communication
between the switch and controller standardized and gives
the possibility to utilize standard OpenFlow applications. The
Kandoo module intercepts the OpenFlow traffic and monitors
it for elephant flows using the “App Detect” application. As
long as no elephant flow is detected, the local controller
processes the flow requests as micro flows. Elephant flows are
detected using the threshold scheme from DevoFlow, which
relays an event to the Kandoo module of the root controller
in case of positive detection.
To propagate events from the local controllers to the root
controller, a messaging channel is used. The root controller
must subscribe to this channel in order to receive events.
After receiving an elephant flow detection trigger, the “App
Re-Route” determines an optimal route and requests the local
controllers to install this route. The developers of [20] have
not given any information on how the re-routing process is
executed and which routing schemes are used.
Some measurements have been performed on a (small) tree
topology with the Kandoo framework installed. Results show
comparisons between the topology in a standard OpenFlow
and Kandoo configuration. As expected, less events are pro-
cessed by the root controller, but no information is given
about the workload and performance of the local controllers.
Overall we can state that the simulations and measurements
are too limited to give a good indication of the performance
enhancement provided by Kandoo. The limiting factor in the
Kandoo configuration is the interface between the switch and
the local controller, as in DevoFlow is shown that this interface
is the limiting factor in current SDN network implementations.
If the limit on this interface is not reached, the layered
controller solution is an interesting concept which can also
be useful to tackle security and resiliency problems.
E. FlowVisor
Virtualization is a widely applied technique allowing mul-
tiple instances on the same hardware resources. Hardware
resources are abstracted by an abstraction layer and presented
to a virtualization layer. On top of the virtualization layer,
instances are presented with virtualized hardware resources
that one can control as if without virtualization. This approach
is roughly similar to the SDN philosophy, but in FlowVi-
sor by Sherwood et al. [22] the virtualization approach is
reapplied, where OpenFlow-compliant switches are offered to
the FlowVisor abstraction layer. FlowVisor offers slices of
the network topology to multiple OpenFlow guest controllers,
where the slices are presented as virtual OpenFlow switches.
The guest controllers control the slices, where FlowVisor
translates the configurations and network policies from each
slice to Flow Rules on the physical OpenFlow switches. If this
approach is applied to large networks, scalability problems can
be resolved as control of the OpenFlow switches is divided
over multiple controllers. To distinguish network slices, four
dimensions are defined in FlowVisor:
• Slice - Set of Flow Rules on a selection of switches of
the network topology to route traffic;
• Separation - FlowVisor must ensure that guest controllers
only can control and observe the assigned part of the
topology;
• Sharing - Bandwidth available on the topology must be
shared over the slices, where minimum data rates can be
assigned for each slice;
• Partitioning - FlowVisor must partition the Flow Tables
from the hardware OpenFlow switches and keep track of
the flows of each guest controller.
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Figure 13. Network virtualization on OpenFlow network topology - Regular
OpenFlow traffic (Flow Requests, status and traffic statistics) from the
OpenFlow module is sent to the FlowVisor Forwarding Module. Depending on
the slice configuration and slice policy, OpenFlow traffic is forwarded to the
Translation Module of the “virtual” switches. Guest controllers (which can be
any OpenFlow controller) communicate with the translation modules, where
Flow Rules are translated, forwarded and installed if they do not interfere
with the network policy for that slice.
With these four dimensions and definitions, OpenFlow re-
sources can be virtualized and shared over multiple instances.
This means that a single hardware OpenFlow switch can be
controlled by multiple guest controllers. To provide more de-
tails on the functioning of network virtualization in OpenFlow,
FlowVisor is represented in figure 13.
As illustrated in figure 13, FlowVisor acts like a transparent
layer between hardware switches and the controllers. Hard-
ware OpenFlow switches are assigned to the virtualization
layer, where FlowVisor advertises itself as a controller. Open-
Flow traffic is transmitted to FlowVisor at the virtualization
layer, where the network capacity is sliced and divided over
multiple users. The FlowVisor Forwarding Module checks
on policy violations, before traffic is sent to the Translation
module at the virtual OpenFlow switch. At the translation
module, the traffic is translated and sent to the guest con-
trollers, assigned to the corresponding slices. Flows coming
from the guest controllers are checked on interference with the
slice policy and translated to flows for the hardware switches.
Via the forwarding module the guest flows are installed at the
switches. The projection shows a straight forward example
of a T (N/1 − P/C/0) configuration, where one FlowVisor
instance performs all virtualization tasks, but more complex
configurations are possible.
Adding an additional layer between the switch and control
layer creates unwanted overhead. Experiments show that re-
sponse times for the processing of Flow Requests increased
from 12 ms to 16 ms. This means that FlowVisor accounts for
an additional delay of 4 ms, in comparison to non-virtualized
OpenFlow topologies [22]. Besides the delay measurements,
experiments were performed to test bandwidth sharing be-
Table III
COMPARISON OF SCALABILITY SOLUTIONS AND COMPONENTS.
Solution Standarized Complexity Decision Classification
HyperFlow +/− + Global X
ONIX − + Global X
DevoFlow +/− +/− Semi-Global V
Kandoo + − Semi-Global V
FlowVisor + +/− Semi-Global X
Solution Availability Performance Reliability
WheelFS +/− − +
DHT + + −
SQL + − +
tween slices and CPU utilization on the hardware OpenFlow
switches. Network policies must include minimal bandwidth
guarantees (QoS parameters) for each user, to prevent unfair
use of the network.
An aspect not covered in FlowVisor is security. Additional
mechanisms for classification of traffic and checking of Flow
Rules may be required to ensure full separation and isolation
between network traffic on the slices.
F. Conclusion on scalability
Five different concepts on scalability have been reviewed.
All solutions propose to divide workload over multiple in-
stances. However, it remains difficult to come with an optimal
scalability solution for SDN networks. As can be seen from
table III, trade-offs have to be made by network designers
and managers. Table III gives an overview of the proposed
frameworks and their components. Besides observations from
the review, also a column is defined for standardization. This
indicates availability of used components in the framework.
Unfortunately, only FlowVisor is available as open-source
software, but on conceptual level standardized components
can be used to reproduce the other proposed frameworks. A
high standardization in the table indicates that the solution
is built up from standard available OpenFlow components. A
part of the table is dedicated to data storage solutions used
in ONIX and HyperFlow and is useful for future distributed
layer developments and comparisons.
VI. RESILIENCY IN SDN
In regular networks, when the control logic of a switch fails,
only network traffic over that particular switch is affected.
When failover paths are preprogrammed into neighboring
switches, backup paths are available and on failure detection,
backup paths can be activated. If the control logic in an SDN
enabled network fails, the forwarding and routing capabilities
of the network are down, resulting in drop of Flow Requests,
undelivered data packets and an unreliable network. In an
early stage of the development of the OpenFlow protocol,
this problem was identified and from protocol version 1.2,
a master-slave configuration at the control layer can be ap-
plied to increase the network resiliency to failing OpenFlow
controllers.
We define robustness of a topology as the measure of
connectivity in a network after removing links and switches.
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controllers using OpenFlow protocol 1.2 (and higher) and the CPRecovery
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Its resiliency indicates its ability to re-allocate redundant paths
within a specified time window. On the controller side, the
robustness of a single or group of OpenFlow controller(s)
is defined as the resistance of controller(s) before entering
failure states. The resilience is defined as the ability to recover
control logic after a failure. As described, the definitions
for robustness and resiliency can have different meanings,
depending on the viewpoint of the designer. In this overview,
examples and proposals of both viewpoints are discussed.
Before proposed solutions on resiliency and robustness will
be reviewed, a small retrospect to section V is made, as all
those solutions house the ability to increase the robustness of
an SDN network. By partitioning the workload of a single
controller over multiple instances, the robustness of the net-
work is increased. Failure of a single controller will only result
in an uncontrollable part of the network. To recover from a
failure and increase the resiliency, additional logic is required.
For both viewpoints, timely detection of a failure and a fast
failover process are basic requirements. To create a robust
and resilient network, the network topology must include
redundant paths [24]. For a resilient control layer, the network
state must be synchronized and identical between master
and slave controllers. Additional modules and synchronization
schemes must meet these requirements without compromising
the performance and adding unwanted latency.
This section will review resiliency of 3 different aspects
important to the network: (1) Section VI-A focuses on the
resiliency at the control layer; (2) Sections VI-B to VI-E
give more insight in topology failure recovery and protection
schemes, while section VI-F discusses the more special case
of in-band networks where the control and forwarding plane
share the same transport layer; (3) Finally, section VI-G SDN
network security.
A. Replication component for controller resiliency
In [25] the master-slave capabilities of the OpenFlow proto-
col are utilized to deliver controller robustness. This indicates
that a primary controller (master) has control over all switches
and on the master failure, a backup controller (slave) can
take over control of assigned switches. Fonseca et al. [25]
introduce a solution, indicated in this review as CPR, which
integrates a replication component into a standard OpenFlow
controller. As replication component the “Primary-Backup”
protocol is applied, to offer resilience against failures and a
consistent view of the latest failure-free state of the network.
The primary-backup protocol synchronizes the state of the
primary controller with the backup controllers. In CPR two
phases are distinguished, namely the replication and recovery
phases. During the replication phase, calculated flows by the
primary controller are synchronized over the backup con-
trollers. After failure detection of the primary controller, the
recovery process is initiated to reallocate a primary controller
and restore flow calculations. With the replication component
integrated in an OpenFlow controller, the solution can be
classified as a T (N/− /C+R/0) topology. Hereby we denote
that always one primary controller is present, with C − 1
remaining backup controllers. The current implementation of
the OpenFlow protocol allows a total of C = 4 controllers. In
figure 14 the synchronization process of CPR is shown.
The CPR solution connects to standard OpenFlow-
compliant switches and is built upon the NOX OpenFlow
controller. Additional components, to enable replication, are
integrated into the NOX controller as modules. The switches
are configured in the master-slave setting, allowing multiple
controllers in a predefined listing. During the replication phase,
flow requests are sent from the switch to the primary controller.
At the controller, the ordinary processes are executed for
routing and forwarding. After the flow is calculated in the area
flow scheduler, it is intercepted by the “CPRecovery” module.
This module determines whether the controller is assigned as
primary and on positive identification the flow is added to the
source table of the controller. Via the “Messenger” module, the
source table of the backup controllers are synchronized using
the primary-backup protocol. After all controllers are updated
and synchronized, the flow is installed into the switches. This
replication procedure enables a fully synchronized backup,
before the flows are installed to the switches. So when the
primary fails, the second assigned controller can seamlessly
take over network control. A drawback of this replication
scheme is the additional latency introduced to the complete
flow install process.
All network switches can be configured to perform activity
probing on the primary controller. If the primary controller
fails to reply within a configurable time window (τ ), the
network switch starts the recovery phase and assigns the first
backup controller from the list as primary controller. On the
controller side, when a join request from the switches is
received by a backup controller, this controller will set itself as
primary controller and the replication phase is started. Update
messages from the primary controller are also sent to the
original primary controller and on its recovery it is assigned
as one of the secondary controllers.
The replication and recovery processes seem to solve the re-
siliency problem with OpenFlow controllers, but the primary-
backup protocol and the recovery phase may fail in case of a
temporary network partitioning and geographically separated
controllers. To explain the potential flaw, the example topology
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Figure 15. Example topology for network partitioning - On a link failure
between S3 and S4 the topology is partitioned and the backup controller
C2,S will be assigned as primary by switch S4 to S6 using the primary
backup protocol.
T (6/− /2+R/0) of figure 15 is used.
On normal operation, controller C1,P is assigned as primary
and controller C2,S as secondary (backup) controller. At time
t the link S3 − S4 becomes unavailable and the network is
partitioned into two components by the following reasoning.
Switches S1 to S3 are under control of the original primary
controller, where the remaining switches (S4 to S6) will
select the secondary controller as new controller, as the time
window on activity probing expires on t + τ . We question
the behavior of the replication and recovery phase of the
replication component (and the primary-backup protocol) in
case link S3−S4 becomes operational. Switches S4 to S6 will
not re-assign to the original primary controller, so the network
topology remains partitioned until failure of controller C2. In
[25] and other performed research no specific measurements
are performed on the influence of geographical positioning of
OpenFlow controllers and their secondary problems, like flow
synchronizing and primary controller selection. To solve this
problem, a more advanced synchronization scheme is required,
with primary controller propagation and election schemes.
To test the functionality and the performance of the repli-
cation component, Fonseca et al. [25] performed two sim-
ulations. In the first simulation the packet delay between
two hosts in a tree topology with the primary and backup
controllers connected to the top switch are measured. At
specific times the primary controller is forced into a failure
state. Where the average packet delay is 20 ms, the delay
rises to approximately 900 ms during the recovery phase.
After the rise, the packet delay normalizes to average and the
network functions normally. Although the replication phase is
successful, the delay during the recovery phase is unacceptable
for carrier-grade data networks providing voice services, which
require end-to-end delays not to exceed 50 ms.
The second simulation measured the response time of a flow
install. Therefore multiple measurements have been performed
using the number of secondary controllers as variable. As
described earlier, the CPRecovery module first synchronizes
the secondary controllers, before installing a computed Flow
Rule into the switch Flow Table. The measurements show
that the response time increases linearly with the number of
secondary controllers, with a minimum response time of 8
ms when no backup controller is configured and a maximum
of 62 ms with 3 secondary controllers to synchronize. The
linear expansion of the response times is unacceptable for
data networks. We propose to increase the performance of
the CPRecovery module and lower the response times by per-
forming the install of the Flow Rule and the synchronization
to the secondary controllers in parallel or first installing the
Flow Rule and perform synchronization afterwards.
B. Reactive link failure recovery
In [26] three existing switching and routing modules (L2-
Learning, PySwitch, Routing) from the NOX-controller are
compared as recovery mechanisms. Additionally, a predeter-
mined recovery mechanism is added. In the following the
modules are discussed shortly on their ability to recover links.
• L2-learning - The standard switching module of the NOX
controller functions similarly to a common layer-2 switch.
However, the applied NOX-controller lacks the Spanning
Tree Protocol (STP);
• L2-learning PySwitch - The functioning of this module is
very similar to the standard L2-learning module. It is ex-
tended with two mechanisms to improve its performance.
The first implemented extension adds aging timers to the
installed Flow Rules, so that the switch can remove and
update its Flow Table. Every time a switch processes
a packet, the time-stamp of the flow rule is updated.
To protect the Flow Table, the hard-time must be larger
than the idle-time. The second mechanism applied is the
application of STP [27], to remove possible networking
loops in the topology;
• Routing - The routing module uses three mechanisms to
compute Flow Rules. To enable routing, the control must
maintain the network topology for path computations. To
detect connected switches and link failures, on a regular
basis the switch sends Link Layer Discovery Protocol
(LLDP) packets, containing information about the switch
MAC-address, port number and VLAN indicator. A re-
ceiving OpenFlow switch replies with an LLDP-packet
containing its own parameters. When the reply packet
is received by the corresponding switch, the assigned
controller is informed about the detected link and the
network topology is updated. The recovery capabilities of
the routing module depend on the discovery mechanism
and the configured timeout interval. If an LLDP-packet
is not received within the configured interval, the switch
declares the link lost and informs the controller of the
status change;
• Pre-determined - The pre-determined module does not
rely on learning and discovery mechanisms, but it imple-
ments path protection at the control layer. In the controller
multiple static paths are provided by the network man-
ager. Based on priority and available paths, the controller
chooses a path and installs it on the switches accordingly.
On a network failure the controller can choose a redun-
dant path from the provided paths, reducing the need for
link discovery mechanisms and path calculations. As the
network manager provides the paths, no spanning tree
protocol is needed (assuming that the paths are loop-free).
The first three mechanisms work dynamically and provide
path restoration, whereas the fourth mechanism is especially
designed for path protection. This module applied to the
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Table IV
COMPARISON OF PROPERTIES AND RESULTS ON LINK RECOVERY MECHANISMS.
Name Update forwarding table Recovery scheme Recovery Time
L2-Learning Traffic / ARP - / ARP Seconds - Minute
L2-Learning PySwitch Traffic / ARP Aging timers / ARP Seconds - Minute
Routing LLDP Aging timers / LLDP Seconds - Minute
Pre-determined Manually Configured MilliSeconds
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Figure 16. Recovery mechanisms - In total four mechanisms are available
to recover from a link failure. All mechanisms have their own link failure
detection methods. On link failure, the enabled mechanism will construct a
new path and install these into the switch flow table.
topology leads to the classification T (N/−/C+R/0), because
additional logic is added to the controller to improve its
performance on link resiliency. Figure 16 projects the four
recovery mechanisms onto the graphical framework.
From the OpenFlow module at the switch, Flow Requests
and link status information are exchanged with the controller.
In figure 16 the four recovery modules are drawn, but only
one module at a time is active. Furthermore, the routing and
PySwitch modules are marked, to indicate the availability of
the spanning tree protocol. Each of the modules can determine
Flow Rules, based on the available information. The L2-
learning and pre-determined modules install Flows without
aging timers, while the routing and PySwitch modules set
times to protect flow tables at the switch. In [26] simulations
have been performed on a T (6/ − /1+R/0) topology to
show the behavior of the different modules and measurements
have been taken to see if the link-recovery requirements are
achievable. The topology contained multiple cycle and Sharma
et al. [26] showed that much traffic is traversing between the
OpenFlow switches and the controller, to maintain link-status
information. Only the pre-determined module consumed less
traffic, which is expected from its static and fixed design.
To simulate network traffic, ping packets were sent with an
interval of 10 ms between two end-hosts. On a specified
time, a link failure was initiated and the recovery time and
number of dropped packets measured. Measurements show
that it takes 108 ms for a link failure detection to be indicated
on the controller. This value is already above the required
50 ms, so any recovery mechanism discussed in this research
will fail. The pre-determined module acts immediately on a
link failure, which results in recovery times of approximately
12 ms, resulting in a total delay of 120 ms. Results for
the routing and PySwitch modules show that the recovery
depends on the idle and hard times set in the aging timer.
The L2-Learning mechanism fails recovery of a path without
the application of the Address Recovery Protocol (ARP) [28].
Table IV summarizes the properties and results of the four
recovery mechanisms, where a distinction is made on how
topology (link) information is maintained, how the mechanism
recovers from link failures and on what time scale paths are
recovered.
Unfortunately, no experiments have been performed on
varying the idle and hard times of the routing and PySwitch
modules. Reducing these times, we believe, can have much
influence on the recovery process of links. Also changing
the default timeout timers of ARP and LLDP can improve
the performance. The current implementation of the pre-
determined module can act fast on a link failure, but lacks the
ability of constructing paths on demand by using dynamically
received topology information.
C. Path-based protection
As shown in the previous section, the reactive and pre-
determined recovery schemes implemented at the control layer
do not meet the 50 ms recovery time requirement for carrier-
grade networks. Sharma et al. [29] came with a similar
proposal, but now applied on the switch layer. This reduces the
recovery time, as no communication with the control layer is
required. Multiple schemes can be applied to recover paths
in case of link failures, where a distinction can be made
between protection and restoration schemes [24]. Protection
schemes do not need communication with the controller to
restore paths, as actions are pre-configured at the switch
layer. Restoration schemes require communication between
the switch and controller and recovery paths are dynamically
allocated.
In [29] the 1 : 1 protection scheme is implemented as
a protection mechanism at the switch layer, where 1 : 1
refers to activating a backup path after failure of the primary
path. To enable this mechanism, the Group Table concept of
the OpenFlow protocol is utilized. In normal operation, the
destination address from a packet is matched in the Flow Table
and the packet will be forwarded to the correct port or dropped.
By applying Group Tables, a flow rule can also contain a
link to a unique group. In the Group Table, one or more
Action Buckets define actions based on status parameters.
On change of these parameters, the action bucket executes
a predefined action. In case of the protection scheme, when
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Figure 17. 1 : 1 Recovery scheme - Two schemes are visible to recover
from a failure. The protection scheme utilizes the BFD path failure detection
protocol in cooperation with Group Tables and Action Buckets to enable 1 :
1 path protection. Restoration of failed links is executed by the controller
and a modified routing module which uses LoS for link failure detection.
New constructed paths are installed to the switches, without incorporating
the failed link.
a failure is detected in the path, the backup path is enabled
for the flow. For path failure detection the Bidirectional
Forwarding Detection (BFD) [30] protocol is implemented.
To monitor the complete path between multiple OpenFlow
switches, a BFD session is configured between the entry and
exit switches. If the periodical messaging over the session fails,
BFD assumes the path lost, updates the action bucket in the
OpenFlow switches and the protected path is installed. The
1 : 1 protection scheme implemented on a topology leads to
a T (N+R/− /1/0) system.
The second implementation in [29] is the 1 : 1 restoration
scheme at the switch layer. An extension to the standard
routing module of the NOX controller is made to increase
the resiliency. The failure detection capabilities of the rout-
ing module depend on the OpenFlow aging timers and the
implementation of a topology module incorporating LLDP
packets. The extended routing module uses the “Loss of
Signal” (LoS) failure detection mechanism available in the
OpenFlow protocol. LoS detects port changes in the switch
from “Up” to “Down” and reports these to the controller. Other
than BFD, LoS does not monitor complete paths, but only local
links at the switch. On link failure detection, a notification is
sent to the routing module and a new path is constructed,
without incorporating the failed link. The new path with its
corresponding flow rules are installed in the switches, after
which the path is recovered. The proposed solution for path
restoration is classified as T (N/− /1+R/0).
The protection scheme most likely restores paths faster,
as no communication is required with the controller and
backup paths are preconfigured. The restoration scheme is
more adaptive and is more flexible, as paths are calculated with
status parameters of the current topology. In a large network,
both schemes can be applied, depending on the network
services provided. A combined scheme can be classified as
a T (N+R/− /1+R/0) topology, as shown in figure 17.
In normal operation, the process of packet forwarding is
similar to the standard OpenFlow operation. On protected
paths, the BFD protocol monitors the status and on failure the
action buckets in the Group Table are updated. Actions defined
in the Action Buckets, enable the protected path. In case of
restoration, the OpenFlow module monitors a link failure,
after which the routing module in the controller constructs
and installs a new path. An important aspect of the recovery
process is the latency between time of link failure and the
recovery of all affected flows. In [29] an analytical model is
given for the restoration process. It gives a good indication
where the latency is introduced in the recovery process. We
have extended the model with the protection scheme, to
indicate the differences between both recovery schemes.
TR = TLoS +
F∑
i=1
(TLU,i + TC,i + TI,i) (1)
TP = max(TBFD,1, ..., TBFD,N ) + (2)
P∑
i=1
max(TAB,1,i, ..., TAB,N,i)
The total restoration time (TR) is determined by the loss-of-
signal failure detection time (TLoS), the total time spent at the
controller to look up the failed link (TLU ), the path calculation
time (TCALC), the flow install / modification time (TI ) and
the number of flows (F ) to restore. In here the propagation
delay, which is assumed to be small (∼ 1ms), is integrated with
the failure detection and flow installation time. The protection
model depends on the BFD failure detection time (TBFD), the
time to process the action bucket (TAB) and the number of
flows affected by the link failure (P ). Because a broken flow
is only restored after the processing of the “slowest” of N
switches in the path, the max operator is applied.
To give an indication of the latency differences, multiple
simulations and measurements have been performed on dif-
ferent topologies in [29]. Results are show in table V. Delay
times to process the action buckets are unknown and likely
not more than several milliseconds.
Both recovery schemes were able to recover paths on link
failure. The main difference in performance is found in the
failure detection mechanism. Where BFD only needs 40 ms
to detect a path failure, the LoS mechanism takes more than
100 ms to report a broken link. A main disadvantage of the
application of BFD in the protection scheme is the introduced
overhead for monitoring all paths. Furthermore, the fixed pre-
planned configuration is inflexible and the experiments were
performed in such a way that link failures did not influence
the protected paths. Restoration is more flexible by allocating
restoration paths dynamically with up-to-date network topol-
ogy information. Recovery times for both schemes mainly
depend on the number of flows to recover in the network.
Restoration times can exceed 1000 ms, if a large number of
flows need recovering.
D. Link-based protection
In addition to the path-based discovery discussed in the
previous section, Van Adrichem et al. [31] propose to deploy
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Table V
COMPARISON OF TIME DELAYS IN LINK RESTORATION AND PROTECTION.
Time Symbol Delay (ms) Relation Comment
Failure detection time (P ) TBFD 40 - 44 Fixed
Failure detection time (R) TLoS 100 - 200 Fixed
Controller look-up time (R) TLU 1 - 10 Linear Delay with 250 - 3000 flows
Path calculation time (R) TCALC 10 - 200 Linear Delay with 25 - 300 paths
Flow installation time (R) TI 1 - 5 Linear Delay with 1000 - 10000 flows
link-based monitoring and protection to overcome topology
failure. Their contribution in minimizing recovery time is
twofold:
1) They minimize failure detection time. By using link-
based, instead of path-based, BFD monitoring sessions,
the per-session RTT and thus BFD interval window is
minimized compared to per-path sessions. Experiments
show that configurations with a BFD interval window of
1 ms are feasible.
2) They adapt the Group Table implementation of the
OpenFlow capable software switch Open vSwitch to
consider BFD status real-time, hence eliminating the
administrative processes of bringing an interface’ status
down.
Herewith, they enable a controller to employ protection by
configuring per-switch backup paths using BFD aware Group
Table rules. Where path-based failure monitoring has a com-
plexity of O(N ×N) sessions, link-based failure monitoring
decreases to a complexity of O(L), where N and L respec-
tively represent the number of nodes and links in a network.
Hence, the number of BFD sessions traversing each link is
limited to exactly 1.
The experiments of [31] show a recovery time as low
as 3.3 ms independent of network size. Instead, due to the
software nature of Open vSwitch - the solution scales to
the degree of each node, emphasizing the need for hardware
implementations of BFD and packet forwarding.
Since the proposed solution deploys per-switch backup
paths, in exceptional cases crankback routing may need to be
applied. Where a fast failure recovery is still guaranteed, the
solution is suboptimal. However, in time the network controller
will be notified of the change in topology and can reconfigure
the network to an optimal state without service interruption.
E. Segment-based protection
Where the previous two sections discuss path- and link-
based protection against network failure, the research in [32]
proposes a hybrid approach, where individual segments of a
path are protected. The main idea is to provide a working
path, as well as a backup path for each switch invoked
in the working path. Both paths are installed in the Flow
Tables with different priorities and after failure detection, the
flows for the working path are removed from the table by
additional mechanisms in OpenFlow, after which the backup
flow becomes the working path. In figure 18 the projection to
the graphical framework is given (note the overlap with figure
17).
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Figure 18. OpenFlow segment protection scheme - Along with the working
path, backup paths are provided to the OpenFlow switch to protect segments.
An extended Recovery Module in the OpenFlow module rejects flows from
the Flow Table after a failure detection and enables backup paths for the
segments. To prevent backup flows from removal by the idle timers, the
recovery module transmits renewal messages over the backup paths.
The failure detection mechanism in [32] is unknown and to
trigger the backup paths, two additional modules are added to
the OpenFlow protocol version 1.0. For removing the flows
for the working path from the Flow Table, an “auto-reject”
mechanism is developed. This mechanism deletes entries when
the port status from the OpenFlow switches changes. The
second developed mechanism “flow renewal” is used to update
flow entries for the backup paths. Backup paths are installed
using idle timers and while the working path is active, update
messages are transmitted over the backup paths to update the
idle timers, preventing automatic flow removal by OpenFlow.
Multiple experiments have been performed with the adapted
version of OpenFlow, utilizing segment protection with the
“auto-reject” and “flow renewal” mechanisms. Results show
average recovery times with a variable number of flow entries
per switch around 30 ms, with a maximum of 65 ms. The
fact that modifications and extensions must be made to the
OpenFlow protocol, leading to a non-standard implementation,
makes that we do not recommend the solution in [32] for large
SDN implementations.
F. In-band OpenFlow networks
In sections (VI-B) to (VI-E), the controller was connected
in an “out-of-band” configuration, which indicates that sepa-
rate connections from the switch to the controller are avail-
able. Only control traffic traverses over these connections,
ensuring no delays or traffic congestion between controller
and switches. In an “in-band” configuration, control traffic
traverses the same connections as data traffic. No additional
network interfaces are needed. With the application of an in-
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Figure 19. Example configuration for control traffic restoration - A. Normal
situation. B. Link failure and controller notification. C. Update intermediate
switches to restore control path. D. Communication between S3 and controller
is restored.
band configuration to a network, Sharma et al. [33] discovered
a problem. When a link failure occurs and the communication
between a switch and controller is lost, the basic operations
for a switch are to restore the connection by requesting a
new connection after waiting for an echo request timeout. The
minimum value for the timeout is limited to 1 second, which
is a magnitude of 20 too long for proper path recovery in
carrier-grade networks. Therefore in [33] the restoration and
protection schemes from [29] are reused to solve the problem.
As seen before, data traffic paths can be restored or pro-
tected from a link failure. In case of restoration, the failed
data traffic paths cannot be restored without communication
channels between the switches and the controller. Therefore,
first the control path must be restored after which the data
paths can be reinstalled on the switches by the controller.
In order to implement this priority of processing the link
failure, the “Barrier Request and Reply Messages” concept
from the OpenFlow protocol is utilized. In “normal” operation,
OpenFlow messages can be reordered by the switches for
performance gains. To stop reordering, Barrier Messages are
sent by the controller and the switches must, upon receiving
a Barrier Request, process all preceding instructions before
processing the following request. After processing of the
Barrier Request, a reply is sent to the controller. To clarify
the restoration process in an in-band configuration, an example
topology with process description is given in figure 19.
In figure 19, in total four phases are distinguished from
normal operation to link failure and restoration of the control
channel for switch S3:
• Phase A - Initial phase where the control traffic for switch
S3 is routed over switch S1 and S2 to the controller. In
a normal “out-of-band” configuration, S3 would have a
separate network connection with the controller;
• Phase B - The link between switches S2 and S3 fails
and the communication between S3 and the controller
stops. Switch S2 monitors the link failure with the LoS
mechanism and sends an error report to the controller via
S1;
• Phase C - The controller calculates the new control path
over S1 and S4 to S3 with highest priority, whereafter
the data traffic paths are recalculated. These paths cannot
yet be installed into switch S3, as the broken path is still
present in the flow table. Therefore the controller first
Table VI
COMPARISON OF RECOVERY SCHEMES IN IN-BAND CONFIGURATIONS.
Recovery Scheme (Control - Data) Symbol Analytical Relationship
Restoration - Restoration TR,R TRC + TRD
Restoration - Protection TR,R max(TRC , TP )
Protection - Protection TP,P TP
Protection - Restoration TP,R max(TP , TR)
updates S1 and S4;
• Phase D - The flow modification messages are processed
and the reply message is sent to the controller by S1
and S4. After both barrier reply messages are received
by the controller, the new control path to switch S3 is
configured at the intermediate switches. The connection
to the controller is restored and the recalculated data paths
can be installed in all switches.
As seen in the description of the phases, the use of barrier
requests synchronizes the intermediate steps of restoration. Be-
sides restoration, the control traffic path can also be recovered
by a 1 : 1 protection scheme. Protection of the control and
data traffic paths is provided by BFD link failure detection
and the Group Tables with Action Buckets. Main advantages
of protection is that no communication is required and the
switches can autonomously update their flow tables.
Using the restoration and protection schemes, a total of
four recovery schemes are possible. As with the out-of-band
configuration, analytical models can be used to predict the
behavior during the recovery process. The restoration model
for the control traffic path is a modification of the earlier
restoration model. Equations (3) and (4) show the restoration
times for an OpenFlow in-band configuration, where TRC is
the control traffic restoration time, TB is the additional time
delay introduced by the Barrier Message reply mechanism
and TIS,i is the time to install and modify the flow tables
of intermediate switches. The restoration time for data traffic
paths (TRD) is a simplified form of equation (1), without
the LoS failure detection delay as the controller already is
informed about the network failure.
TRC = TLoS + TB +
S∑
i=1
(TLU,i + TC,i + TIS,i + TI,i) (3)
TRD =
F∑
i=1
(TLU,i + TC,i + TI,i) (4)
In table VI the four recovery schemes are given, together with
the analytical delay models.
The analytical relationships in table VI assume that the
recovery and protection processes do not influence each other
at the switch. In [33] multiple measurements have been
preformed on all four in-band recovery schemes. Results
show that when restoration is applied to recover data paths,
delays exceed the 50 ms requirement. Only the full protection
recovery scheme meets the requirements, but in practice this
scheme will not be applied due to large flow tables and the
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Figure 20. General security configuration - The first step is to classify
and mark incoming traffic with statistics from the OpenFlow switch or
external measurements (Classification). Marked Flow Requests go to the
Flow Scheduler where the requests are processed and according actions are
assigned to flows (Action). The last step is to check the flows to the network
security policy (Control) and install the flows at the switches. On policy
violation the Flow Scheduler must be informed.
large number of configurations which have to be made by the
network manager at the switches.
Looking to the differences in the results between TR,R
and TP,R, we can conclude that the performance difference
is small2. This is expected, as only a few control paths to
the switches have to be recovered. With this conclusion, we
can state that for recovery requirements there is no noticeable
performance difference between in- and out-of-band config-
urations, when a full protection scheme is implemented. A
comparison between restoration in both configurations is not
possible due to the differentiation in delay in the measurements
of [29] and [33]. We think it is possible to predict the behavior
for both configurations with the derived analytical models,
when reliable measurements for the defined parameters are
present.
G. Security in SDN
Network security is applied to control networks access,
provide separation between users and protect the network
against malicious and unwanted intruders. It remains a hot
topic under SDN researchers, because a basic security level is
expected from a new network technology, as well as the fact
that network security applications can easily be applied to the
network control logic. We define two levels of security. The
first level invokes logical connections between end hosts inside
the network. Protocols like Secure Socket Layer (SSL) or
packet encrypting techniques must ensure connection security.
Within SDN, this level of security plays an important role, as
the control link between switches and the centralized controller
must be ensured. In the OpenFlow protocol a mechanism to
secure the connection is available, but not required. It is up to
the controller to secure the connection with the switches and a
number of controller implementations have not implemented
link security mechanisms. When no link security is applied, a
2Results show a TLoS of approximately 50 ms in comparison with 100
ms measured in [29].
malicious node can impersonate the controller and take over
control of the switches.
The second level of security is to protect switches, servers
and end hosts in the network. Numerous examples are present
to indicate the threats to the network as a whole. Malicious
software can intrude the network, infect hosts and gather
information, but also flooding attacks can disable network
servers or overload OpenFlow switches and controllers. Se-
curity mechanisms must be implemented on the network to
detect malicious traffic and take necessary actions to block
and reroute this traffic. In current networking, network security
is applied at higher networking layers. Routers and firewalls
perform security tasks at layer 3, whereas end hosts and servers
host security applications at layer 7. With SDN, there is a
central authority that routes traffic through the network and
enables the possibility to apply security policies to all layers
in networking. Much research has been performed and the
results of [34], [35], [36], [37] are used to determine security
properties within SDN. Most researchers follow roughly the
same procedure to apply security to the network. This pro-
cedure consists on three steps where a short description of
the process is given, as well as a reference to the performed
research.
• Classification - Data flows through the network must be
classified in order to determine malicious behavior and
network attacks. Without classification it is impossible to
protect the network and perform countermeasures. The
main source for traffic classification is found in traffic
statistics [35];
• Action - Once a traffic flow is marked as malicious,
the control layer must modify flow tables to protect the
network and prevent propagation of the malicious traffic
through the network. For each threat, different actions are
needed, so the control layer must be flexible for quick
adoption of new protection schemes [34];
• Check - The last security process is the checking of
calculated flow rules with the applied security policy from
the network manager. Flow rules may (unintentionally)
disrupt the security policy and therefore an extra control
process is needed. Preventing network security violations
by checking flow rules before install on the switches,
completes the overall security process [36], [37].
The three processes combined form the protection layer for
the network and all can be implemented at the control layer,
which results in a T (N/ − /1+S/0) configuration. To give
the most general view of this configuration, we assume no
modifications to the switch layer. Figure 20 gives the general
OpenFlow security configuration.
As seen in figure 20, normal Flow Requests and traffic
statistics enter the classification module in the OpenFlow
controller. Traffic statistics can originate from the OpenFlow
module at the switch and result from processed TCP and UDP
traffic dumps. The classification module identifies malicious
traffic flows and has two actions to perform. First, it must
inform the Flow Scheduler with the presence of malicious
flows in the network. Existing flows in the switch tables must
be modified by the Flow Scheduler. Second, incoming Flow
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Requests must be marked, so that the flow scheduler can
process the Flow Requests according to the security policy. At
the scheduler, multiple security modules are present, to install
and modify Flow Tables with rules based on the security policy
for regular traffic and counter measures for the different threats
to the network. So for each traffic flow there exists a unique set
of rules, in order to protect the individual traffic flows within
the network, as well as the network itself. The last step before
Flow Rules can be installed or modified is confirming validity
to the overall security policy of the network. A computed Flow
Rule by a module in the Flow Scheduler can confirm the rule
of that module, but may violate the security policies of other
modules and the overall network security policy. After a Flow
Rule is approved by such a flow policy checker, it can be
installed into the switch Flow Tables.
In theory, the classification process looks easy to execute,
but [35] and [34] have proven otherwise. In [35] an effective
solution is found to identify abnormal traffic and flooding
attacks. The most obvious mechanism to classify traffic flows
are continuous TCP and UDP traffic dumps. With these dumps,
all information is present to identify malicious traffic, but it
takes much computing resources to process all the dumps
continuously. Therefore an intelligent mechanism is employed
to map traffic flows based on traffic statistics. Using the maps,
all flows are characterized and abnormal traffic flows can be
identified and removed from the network. This method is only
to detect flooding attacks, so to detect other threats, more
classification mechanisms are needed. In [34] an application
layer is presented to apply classification modules, as well as
security modules, at the Flow Scheduler. A general application
layer eases implementation of modules for newly identified
threats. Multiple examples in [34] show that with the applica-
tion of classification and security modules, counter measures
for network threats can be implemented into an OpenFlow
environment.
H. Conclusion on resiliency
Where [25] focuses on the resiliency of the control plane
and developed a mechanism to utilize the master-slave concept
for OpenFlow controllers, [26], [29], [31], [32], [33] research
the ability to recover failed links. On the controller side we
can state that a single controller is insufficient in terms of
robustness by a lack of redundancy. With the failure of a
controller the OpenFlow switches will lose the control layer
functionality, resulting in an uncontrolled network topology. If
the 50 ms recovery requirement from carrier-grade networks
is applied, the replication scheme used to improve robustness
will not suffice. Hence, the replication component needs
modifications to lower the repair latency.
On link recovery, five papers are discussed. Although most
recovery concepts start with “traditional” failure recovery
based on Loss-of-Signal to detect failure, these methods have
proven to have a large latency. Instead, actively probing failure
detection mechanisms can detect failures more quickly. Group
Tables with pre-programmed failover logic and fast restoration
of flows by the controller are two proven techniques which
have shown to recover paths within sub 50 ms time. Hence,
recovery from topology failure appears sufficiently covered.
However, an integral solution, where also OpenFlow con-
trollers are redundantly applied, with the ability to recover
network control in millisecond order, needs further research.
Techniques used in the scalability research field can be joined
with the OpenFlow protocol to apply master-slave configu-
rations. Combined with proposed path recovery schemes a
higher level of resilience can be reached in both the control
and forwarding plane.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this overview, we have discussed the basic principles of
SDN, where the control layer is decoupled from the data plane
and merged into a centralized control logic. The centralized
logic, itself controlled by software, has a global view of
the network and has the capabilities to dynamically control
hardware devices for optimal traffic flows through the network.
For communication between the data plane and the control
logic, the OpenFlow protocol is commonly utilized. Two
main problem areas are identified from the reviewed research,
being limited scalability and decreased resiliency due to the
centralized nature of SDN.
To gain detailed insight on performed research in SDN and
OpenFlow networks, we have developed a general framework
and notation in which we classify scientific work related to
scalability and resiliency in SDN. We have made a separation
in proposed solutions based on scalability and resiliency
issues. Due to the centralization of the control logic, scalability
issues exist on the number of hardware devices to control by a
single control logic or the number of Flow Requests processed
by the logic. Solutions can be found in increasing performance
of the central logic, reducing the number of tasks to perform
by the central control logic or dividing hardware resources
with either virtualization or introducing multiple coexisting
controllers.
On resiliency three problem areas have been distinguished,
being the resistance of both the controller and the network
topology against failures, as well as the network resilience
against malicious attacks (security). Resiliency of SDN net-
works can be increased with the application of redundant
network controllers and replication of internal network state,
while recovery schemes can protect against network topology
failures.
However, as each implementation seems to make trade-offs,
possible solutions are still suboptimal by nature. The topics
of scalability and topology failure may be sufficiently solved
by combining the decrease of control overhead, distributing
multiple controllers among a network, and deploying discussed
failure protection mechanisms. The topic of recovery from
controller failure, however, seems underrepresented and needs
to be researched more thoroughly.
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